Footnotes

1116 Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979).1117 E.g., Owen v. United States, 851 F.2d 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Banks v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 501 (2006); Alameda Gateway, Ltd. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 757 (1999).

1104 See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 125-26 (1967); Filiaggi, 90 F.3d at 794 & nn.2-3; Miller v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 669, 674 n.3 (Cl. Ct. 1982), aff’d, 714 F.2d 160 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (mem.); see also 33 U.S.C. § 595 (2012) (codifying offset of “special and direct benefits to the remainder” for partial takings “in connection with any improvement of rivers, harbors, canals, or waterways of the United States”); cf. Horne

1113 River Rouge, 269 U.S. at 417-18. While the remainder property may be subject to the navigational servitude, it is “fundamental error” to “over-emphasi[ze] the contingent character of the rights of the riparian owners.” Id. at 420-21.1114 E.g., United States v. Fort Smith River Dev. Corp., 349 F.2d 522, 525-26 (8th Cir. 1965) (reversing award that failed to consider special benefits due to United States’ revetment project that “manifestly” protected remainder land “from further reliction or erosion. That fact alone apparently places [the remainder] in a ‘better position’ because of the taking” and must be considered).

1108 Cf. Birnbach, 400 F.2d at 382-83 (holding that in determining damage to remainder property in partial taking affected by navigational servitude, an “important distinction must be made so that the enhancement in value ‘flowing’ from a riparian location may not be recognized when the riparian character of the [remainder] land is destroyed”). While Birnbach predated § 595a, the statute did not change the compensation for damage to remainder property. See Pete, 447 F.2d at 770-71 (discussing Birnbach and § 595a).1109 As discussed in Section 4.6.4.1, the taking plus damages valuation method (the State Rule) is generally improper in valuations for federal acquisition purposes. It cannot be used in federal acquisitions (under § 595a or otherwise) without appropriate legal instructions.…

1096 33 U.S.C. § 595a; Filiaggi, 90 F.3d at 795-96; see United States v. 101.88 Acres of Land in St. Mary Par. (Avoca Island), 616 F.2d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting government may use submerged lands subject to navigational servitude “for any purpose in aid of navigation without compensating the owner”).

1103 United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land in Greene Cty. (Filiaggi), 90 F.3d 790, 794 n.3 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting h.r. rep. no. 91-1665, at 31 (1970)); see

1092 Filiaggi, 90 F.3d at 794 & n.3; 13.20 Acres in Lincoln, 629 F. Supp. at 247; see Pete, 447 F.2d at 771. As discussed in Section 4.3.3, the appraiser must determine the larger parcel to distinguish whether a total or partial acquisition is involved.1093 See Filiaggi, 90 F.3d at 795-96 & nn.4-5 (noting § 595a’s limited nature). 1094 33 U.S.C. § 595a.

1100 E.g., United States v. 13.20 Acres of Land in Lincoln Cty., 629 F. Supp. 242, 243-47 (E.D. Wash. 1986). Similarly, application of the scope of the project rule is also distinct from application of the navigational servitude, regardless of whether § 595a applies. See United States v. Birnbach, 400 F.2d 378 (8th Cir. 1968).1101 33 U.S.C. § 595a; see Section 4.6 (Partial Acquisitions); see also Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 340, 352 (Fed. Cl. 1998) (noting provision “does not abrogate the navigational servitude generally, . . . nor provide compensation for loss or reduction of access to navigable waters”), vacated on other grounds, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

1093 See Filiaggi, 90 F.3d at 795-96 & nn.4-5 (noting § 595a’s limited nature). 1094 33 U.S.C. § 595a.1095 Pete, 447 F.2d at 771; United States v. 8,968.06 Acres of Land in Chambers & Liberty Ctys. (Wallisville), 326 F. Supp. 546, 547-48 (S.D. Tex. 1971); see United States v. 71.29 Acres of Land in Catahoula Par., 376 F. Supp. 1221, 1225-26 (W.D. La. 1974).

1102 United States v. 13.20 Acres in Lincoln Cty., 629 F. Supp. 242, 247 (E.D. Wash. 1986); see also Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 97 (1997), aff’d,189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).