Footnotes

1150 See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10903 (2012) (generally requiring rail carrier to continue to offer service over its lines to shippers unless it first obtains authority to abandon or discontinue lines from Interstate Commerce Commission); United States v. Chi., B. & Q.

1155 See Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 16 (“only some rail-to-trail conversions will amount to takings”); cf. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255-58 (1980) (discussing “important legal and practical differences” between affirmative condemnation proceedings and inverse takings). S ee generally Section 4.9.1156 See, e.g., Rasmuson v. United States, 807 F.3d 1343, 1345-46 (2015) (citing these Standards).

1126 Fuller, 409 U.S. at 491-92. Congress has provided for administrative payments for losses due to cancellation of Taylor grazing permits for war purposes. See 43 U.S.C. § 315q (2012); United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293, 296 (10th Cir. 1951). But these administrative benefits created by statute are separate from compensation under the Fifth Amendment, and beyond the scope of the appraiser’s assignment to estimate market value. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 261, 263-64, 264 n.2 (1950); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379- 80 (1945); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945).“require suspension of the normal rules for determining just compensation.” 1127 Accordingly, compensation…

1128 Duncanville, 469 U.S. at 29 (quoting United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)); accord Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 512- 13; Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 n.14 (1984); see United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949) (“[When there are insufficient comparable sales to determine market value, w]e then say that there is ‘no market’ for the property in question. And it is here that other means of measuring [market] value may have relevance—but only, of course, as bearing on what aprospective purchaser would have paid.”).

1144 Rasmuson, 807 F.3d at 1346.1145 See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land (Lutheran Synod), 441 U.S. 506, 513 (1979) (“This might be the case, for example, with respect to . . . roads or sewers.”); United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949) (“At times, however, peculiar circumstances may make it impossible to determine a ‘market value.’ There may have been, for example, so few sales of similar property that we cannot predict with any assurance that the prices paid would have been repeated in the sale we postulate of the property taken. We then say that there is ‘no market’ for the property in question. But that does not put out…

1138 See Duncanville, 469 U.S. at 33 (discussing Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923)).1139 Bd. of Cty. Supervisors v. United States (Prince William Cty. II), 116 F.3d 454, 458 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding lower court “erred as a matter of law in reading our decision as foreclosing an inquiry into whether the value of the [strips of land] was different from the value of the surrounding land”).

1136 Jefferson Cty. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 146 F.2d 564, 566 (6th Cir. 1945); see Naval Shipyard, 395 F.2d at 268 (“The State has lost the profit potential, if any, which these lands may have had as part of the ‘channel.’ On the other hand, the untaken lands have been relieved of the burdens of the dedication. These and other relevant factors must be considered . . . to determine whether the taking resulted in a decrease in the value of the untaken portion of the channel ”).1137 See United States v. 50 Acres of Land (Duncanville), 469 U.S. 24, 30 (1984) (“basic principles of indemnity embodied in the Just Compensation Clause”); United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land (Lutheran…

1146 See Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 513.1147 Toronto, Hamilton, 338 U.S. at 402; see, e.g., United States v. 3,727.91 Acres of Land (Elsberry Drainage District), 563 F.2d 357, 361-62 (8th Cir. 1977) (error to assume market value of levees and ditches could not be determined without comparable sales evidence and to disregard other evidence of market value).

1140 Id.; see Naval Shipyard, 395 F.2d at 266-68.1141 Bos. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910); see United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 76 (1913) (“[T]here would be no justice in paying for a loss suffered by no one in fact.”); cf. Nebraska v. United States, 164 F.2d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 815 (1948) (no compensation for “a diminution in the market value of the [landowner’s] rights through the creation of a leasehold, easement, or other interest in the land by the [landowner’s] own acts” preceding United States’ acquisition).

1142 See, e.g., Rasmuson v. United States, 807 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (inverse taking of railway corridor converted to trail use). See Section4.11.3.2 for discussion of inverse takings claims regarding rails-to-trails conversions under the 1983 Amendments to the National Trails System Act. 1143 Rasmuson, 807 F.3d at 1346; United States v. 0.59 Acres of Land, 109 F.3d 1493, 1497 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding “the condition of condemned