Footnote 1168

1168 See, e.g., Peace Arch II, 2010 WL 415244, at *2 (dispute over maintenance and operating costs of substitute highway provided as compensation). 1169 See Duncanville, 469 U.S. at 32-33 (quoting Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 81 (1923)), 37 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Lutheran Synod, 441U.S. at 513-17 (“we find no circumstances here that require suspension of the normal rules for determining just compensation”); see alsoeATon, supra note 16, at 234 (“The doctrine of substitute facilities is not a valuation or appraisal technique, but a concept that has evolved from court decisions.”).

Footnote 1167

1167 SeeeATon, supra note 16, at 19-22 (“[A]ppraisers are experts in estimating value, not just compensation.”); Section 4.1.2 (Market Value: The Measure of Just Compensation); Section 4.2.6 (Exceptions to Market Value Standard).

Footnote 1158

1158 See, e.g., Rasmuson, 807 F.3d at 1345-46.1159 Id. (noting railway companies were not obligated to remove physical railroad construction features and landowners would have regained possession of corridor land with physical structures still on it).

Footnote 1153

1153 16 U.S.C. § 1241-51 (2012) (1983 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-11, 97 Stat. 42, 48, amended the National Trails System Act, Pub. L.No. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (1968)); see generally Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 5-8 (discussing Act and Amendments), 15-16 (distinguishing types of acquisitions).

Footnote 1157

1157 Ladd, 630 F.3d at 1025; Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2004).1158 See, e.g., Rasmuson, 807 F.3d at 1345-46.

Footnote 1155

1155 See Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 16 (“only some rail-to-trail conversions will amount to takings”); cf. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255-58 (1980) (discussing “important legal and practical differences” between affirmative condemnation proceedings and inverse takings). S ee generally Section 4.9.1156 See, e.g., Rasmuson v. United States, 807 F.3d 1343, 1345-46 (2015) (citing these Standards).

Footnote 1156

1156 See, e.g., Rasmuson v. United States, 807 F.3d 1343, 1345-46 (2015) (citing these Standards).1157 Ladd, 630 F.3d at 1025; Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

Footnote 1170

1170 See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. Act, 16 U.S.C. § 831q (2012) (authorizing condemnation of property for purpose of relocating railroad tracks, highways, and other properties, enterprises and projects whose removal may be necessary to carry out purposes of Act); Berberich

Footnote 1154

1154 See, e.g., Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Preseault v. United States (Preseault II), 100 F.3d 1525, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

Footnote 1150

1150 See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10903 (2012) (generally requiring rail carrier to continue to offer service over its lines to shippers unless it first obtains authority to abandon or discontinue lines from Interstate Commerce Commission); United States v. Chi., B. & Q.