Footnotes

1189 See Sections 1.11 and 4.12.1190 For example, in 1878, the Supreme Court described a condemnation involving the “appointment of commissioners to . . . secure a fair appraisement of [a property’s] value” followed by a court determination “as to the amount of compensation the owner of the land was entitled to receive[.]” Miss. & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 404-405 (1878). Similarly, in 1893 the Court noted that “[v]iewers were appointed, who reported the value . . . . [and then] the matter was tried before the court . . . as to the question of amount of compensation.” Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 314 (1893); cf. James H. Boykin, Real…

1174 See, e.g., Brown, 263 U.S. at 81-83 (providing new town site as compensation for flooding of three-quarters of existing town); Washington v.

1184 Montego Group, 2010 WL 3734003, at *5; accord 1,014.16 Acres in Vernon, 558 F. Supp. at 1242.violate the unit rule (discussed in Section 4.2.2) and professional appraisal standards. 1185 These components are to be considered, but only in light of how they contribute to the market value of the property as a whole. 1186

1180 See, e.g., United States v. 1.604 Acres of Land (Granby I), 844 F. Supp. 2d 668, 678 (E.D. Va. 2011); United States v. 381.76 Acres of Land (MontegoGroup), No. 96-1813-CV, 2010 WL 3734003, *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2010), adopted sub nom. United States v. 10.00 Acres of Land, No. 99-0672-CIV, 2010 WL 3733994 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Gonzalez, 466 F. App’x 858 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpubl.); 1,014.16 Acres in Vernon, 558 F. Supp. at 1242.

1154 See, e.g., Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Preseault v. United States (Preseault II), 100 F.3d 1525, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

1162 E.g., Brown, 263 U.S. at 81 (United States provided new town site and relocated buildings as compensation for flooding of three-quarters of town due to reservoir project); United States v. Streets, Alleys & Pub. Ways in Vill. of Stoutsville, 531 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1976) (affirming United States’ plan to construct substitute road facilities to compensate Village in kind, rather than monetarily, for taking of gravel streets, public alleys and sidewalks); United States v. 10.56 Acres of Land in Whatcom Cty. (Peace Arch II), No. C07-1261RAJ, 2010 WL 415244, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2010) (United States’ condemnation of interstate highway conduit to construct elevated roadway and then convey new roadway to state).

1155 See Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 16 (“only some rail-to-trail conversions will amount to takings”); cf. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255-58 (1980) (discussing “important legal and practical differences” between affirmative condemnation proceedings and inverse takings). S ee generally Section 4.9.1156 See, e.g., Rasmuson v. United States, 807 F.3d 1343, 1345-46 (2015) (citing these Standards).

1163 Brown, 263 U.S. at 81-83; see Duncanville, 469 U.S. at 30-34, 30 n.12; United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land (Lutheran Synod), 441 U.S. 506, 513 (1979); see also Duncanville, 469 U.S. at 37 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“When a local governmental entity can prove that the market value of its property deviates significantly from the make-whole remedy intended by the Just Compensation Clause and that a substitute facility must be acquired to continue to provide an essential service, limiting compensation to the fair market value in my view would be manifestly unjust.”).

1164 Duncanville, 469 U.S. at 32-33; Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 513-17; see Peace Arch II, 2010 WL 415244, at *2 (noting “mistaken[ ] belie [f ] that the substitute facilities doctrine deems the cost of a substitute facility to be ‘the equivalent’ of a property’s market value[,]” as “the cost of a substitute facility is an alternate measure of just compensation, it is not the equivalent of fair market value”).1165 Duncanville, 469 U.S. at 33-35; Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 511, 514-16; see id. at 517-19 (White, J., concurring) (“The substitute-facilities doctrine is unrelated to fair market value and . . . unabashedly demands additional compensation over and above market value in order to allow the replacement of the…

1159 Id. (noting railway companies were not obligated to remove physical railroad construction features and landowners would have regained possession of corridor land with physical structures still on it).1160 Id. at 1346.